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Presidential Succession and Delegation 
in Case of Disability
[The following m em orandum  discusses issues relating to presidential succession and dele­
gation o f  presidential power in the event o f a tem porary disability o f the President. It 
examines the mechanism established by the T w enty-F ifth  Am endment by w hich the 
Vice President assumes the powers and duties o f the Office o f  the President, and the 
conditions under which the President resumes his Office after his disability is ended. It 
also examines the circumstances in w hich the President may delegate his powers to 
o ther officials, including the Vice President, when it is not considered necessary or 
appropriate to invoke the provisions o f the T w enty-F ifth  Amendment. It concludes 
that functions vested in the President by the C onstitution are generally not delegable 
and must be perform ed by him; how ever, any pow er vested in the President by statute 
may be delegated to subordinate officers, unless the statute affirmatively prohibits such 
delegation. Finally, the m emorandum briefly reviews the form and m ethod o f  delega­
tion. An appendix contains a historical summary o f prior presidential disabilities and the 
resulting effect on presidential authority.]
April 3, 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR TH E ATTORNEY GENERAL
As a result of the recent assassination attempt on President Reagan, 
this Office has researched several issues that relate to presidential suc­
cession and the delegation of presidential power in the event of a 
temporary disability of the President. This memorandum sets forth our 
conclusions on the relevant legal issues.
I. Presidential Succession
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes a 
mechanism for presidential succession in the event that the President 
becomes unable to perform his constitutional duties. Succession may 
take place in two ways. First, if the President is able and willing to do 
so, he may provide for the temporary assumption of the powers and 
duties of his office by the Vice President by “transmit[ting] to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of his office.” U.S. Const., Amend. XXV, §3. 
When the President transmits such a declaration, his powers and duties 
devolve upon the Vice President as Acting President1 until the Presi-
’There appears to be no requirement that the Vice President resign from his position as Vice 
President or take the President's oath of office to serve as “Acting President.” As a general rule, an
Continued
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dent transmits an additional written declaration stating that he has 
become able to perform his responsibilities.
Second, if the President is unable or unwilling to transmit a declara­
tion of his inability to perform his duties, the Vice President will 
become Acting President 2 if the Vice President and a majority of the 
“principal officers of the executive departments” transmit to the Presi­
dent pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House a written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of this Office. See U.S. Const., Amend. XXV, §4. The term 
“principal officers of the executive departments” is intended to mean 
“the Cabinet,” although the term “Cabinet” has no precise legal defini­
tion.3
If, during the period in which the Vice President is Acting President, 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amend­
ment, the President submits to the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House a written declaration that no inability 
exists, he will resume the powers of his office unless, within four days, the 
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet heads transmit an addi­
tional written declaration stating that the President is unable to dis­
charge his powers and duties. At that point, Congress must decide the
official who is “acting” in a certain capacity need not vacate the office previously held or take the 
oath o f office ordinarily taken by the person whose duties he has temporarily assumed This conclu­
sion is supported by Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office o f Vice President: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments o f  the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess 
215, 232 (1965); Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 
1st Sess 87 (1965). See also J. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 199 (1976) (Feerick) The rule 
as to resignation and/or taking the President’s oath appears to be different for those officials further 
down the line of succession See 3 U.S.C. § 19. This memorandum does not address the issues involved 
in the devolution of powers beyond the position of Vice President.
2 The Vice President will evidently continue to exercise the duties of Vice President while he 
serves as Acting President. The Vice President would, however, lose his title as President of the 
Senate. See 111 Cong. Rec. 3270 (1965) (Sen. Saltonstall); Feerick at 199
3 See S. Rep. No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1966) We believe that the “principal officers of the 
executive departments,” for purposes of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, include the Secretary of State, 
Secretary o f Treasury, Secretary o f Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of 
Agriculture, Secretary o f Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
Secretary o f Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary o f Energy, and 
Secretary o f Education. That conclusion is supported by the legislative history See 111 Cong. Rec. 
7938 (1965) (Rep. Waggoner); id. at 7941 (Rep Poff); id. at 7944-45 (Rep. Whitener); id. at 7953, 7954 
(Rep. Gilbert). See also Feerick at 202-03; 5 U S.C. § 101. As a practical matter, and in order to avoid 
any doubt regarding the sufficiency o f  any given declaration, it would be desirable to obtain the assent 
o f a sufficient number of officials to satisfy any definition o f the term “principal officers of the 
executive departments.”
There is some indication that acting heads o f departments may participate in the presidential 
disability determination. Although the legislative history is conflicting, the House Judiciary Commit­
tee's report supports this conclusion, see H R. Rep No. 203, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), as do the 
Senate debates, see 111 Cong. Rec. 15,380 (1965) (Sen. Kennedy); id. at 15,583 (1965) (Sen. Javits); and 
a leading commentator on the Amendment reaches the same conclusion. See Feenck at 203. Contra, 
111 Cong Rec. 3284 (1965) (Rep. Hart). The contrary view proceeds on the assumption that such a 
decision should be made only by persons whom the President personally selected for his Cabinet. Such 
persons are presumably intimately familiar with the President and are of relatively equal status with 
the other decisionmakers.
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issue within specified time limits. See U.S. Const., Amend. XXV, §4, 
para. 2.4
II. Presidential Delegation
Under circumstances in which it is not considered necessary or 
appropriate to invoke the provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
it may nonetheless be desirable for the President to delegate certain 
powers to other officials, including the Vice President. Under statute, 3 
U.S.C. § 301, and under the Constitution, see Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52, 117 (1926), the President has broad authority to delegate 
functions vested in him by law. At the same time, the Constitution and 
certain statutory provisions impose limits on the President’s power to 
confer his authority on subordinate officials. The nature and extent of 
those limits are considered in this section.
A. Constitutional Limitations on the President’s Power to Delegate His 
Functions
As early as 1855, Attorney General Cushing articulated the general 
rule that the functions vested in the President by the Constitution are 
not delegable and must be performed by him. 7 Op. A tt’y Gen. 453, 
464-65 (1855). The Attorney General opined:
Thus it may be presumed that he, the man discharging 
the presidential office, and he alone, grants reprieves and 
pardons for offenses against the United States, not another 
man, the Attorney General or anybody else, by delegation 
of the President.
So he, and he alone, is the supreme commander-in-chief 
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the 
militia of the several States, when called into the actual 
service of the United States. That is a power constitution­
ally inherent in the person of the President. No act of
4 Under the Amendment, we believe that there is no requirement that the requisite written declara­
tions of disability be personally signed by the Vice President and a majority of the heads of executive 
departments. The only requirements are that their assent to the declaration be established in a reliable 
fashion and that they direct that their names be added to the document. Moreover, the Vice President 
and the Cabinet heads may send separate declarations if necessary. See Presidential Inability: Hearings 
Before the House Comm, on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess 79-80 (1965). Finally, we believe that 
under both §§ 3 and 4 o f the Amendment, the transfer o f authonty to the Vice President takes effect 
“immediately" when the declaration is transmitted or sent, and is not delayed until receipt of the 
document by the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. Although the 
question is not free from doubt, the language and the history of the Amendment tend to support this 
conclusion. See S. Rep. No 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1965); H.R. Rep. No 203, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 13 (1965). But see H.R. Rep. No. 564, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (statement of Managers on the Part 
of the House to the effect that “after receipt of the President’s written declaration of his inability.. . . 
such powers and duties would then be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President”) The 
better construction would allow the devolution of powers “immediately” (the word used in § 4 o f the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment) upon transmittal No meaningful purpose would be served by awaiting the 
arrival of the document. The alternative construction allows a more rapid transition of presidential 
power when the national interests require it.
93
Congress, no act even of the President himself, can, by 
constitutional possibility, authorize or create any military 
officer not subordinate to the President.
So he appoints and removes ambassadors and other 
officers of the United States, in the cases and with the 
qualifications indicated by the Constitution.
So he approves or disapproves of bills which have 
passed both Houses of Congress: that is a personal act of 
the President, like the vote of a Senator or a Representa­
tive in Congress, not capable of performance by a Head 
of Department or any other person.
A  study prepared by this Office in the 1950s reaches the same 
conclusions. This study and our research suggest that the following are 
nondelegable functions o f the President:
1. The power to nominate and appoint the officers of the 
United States to the extent provided in Article II, § 2, 
clause 2 o f the Constitution.
2. The power to approve or return legislation pursuant to 
Article I, § 7, clauses 2 and 3, and the power to call 
Congress into special session or to adjourn it according 
to Article II, § 3.
3. The power to make treaties by and with the advice and 
consent o f the Senate. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. It 
should be noted, however, that the power to negotiate 
treaties and the power to enter into executive agree­
ments may be delegated. See 7 Op. A tt’y Gen., supra, at 
465.
4. The power to grant pardons. U.S. Const. Art. II, 
§2, cl. 1.
5. The power to remove purely executive presidential ap­
pointees. This power is vested in the President as an 
incident o f his appointment power. Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. at 119.
6. The power to issue executive orders. Only the President 
can issue formal executive orders and proclamations. He 
can, however, delegate the power to issue many orders 
which cover substantially the same subject matter as 
executive orders and proclamations as long as they are 
not so named.
7. The powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of 
the Army and Navy. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 1. In 
view of Article I, § 8, clauses 12 and 13, which state 
that Congress shall have the power to raise and support
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the Army and to provide and maintain a Navy, many of 
the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief are 
statutory in part. To conclude that the President may 
not delegate his ultimate constitutional responsibilities as 
Commander-in-Chief is not to suggest that he is the 
only officer of the government who may make military 
decisions in time of emergency, when immediate re­
sponse may be necessary. The President may make 
formal or informal arrangements with his civilian and 
military subordinates, in order to ensure that the chain 
of command will function swiftly and effectively in time 
of crisis. Of course, every military officer must be sub­
ordinate to the President.
B. Statutory Limitations on the President’s Power to Delegate His 
Functions
The foregoing discussion sets forth the general rule that the President 
may not delegate inherent powers that are conferred on him by the 
Constitution. On the other hand, he may generally delegate powers that 
have been conferred on him by Congress. Congress has so provided in 
3 U.S.C. § 301, which states:
The President of the United States is authorized to 
designate and empower the head of any department or 
agency in the executive branch, or any official thereof 
who is required to be appointed by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, to perform without approval, 
ratification, or other action by the President (1) any func­
tion which is vested in the President by law, or (2) any 
function which such officer is required or authorized by 
law to perform only with or subject to the approval, 
ratification, or other action of the President: Provided,
That nothing contained herein shall relieve the President 
of his responsibility in office for the acts of any such head 
or other official designated by him to perform such func­
tions. Such designation and authorization shall be in writ­
ing, shall be published in the Federal Register, shall be 
subject to such terms, conditions, and limitations as the 
President may deem advisable, and shall be revocable at 
any time by the President in whole or in part.
Congress has further provided, in 3 U.S.C. § 302, that:
The authority conferred by this chapter shall apply to 
any function vested in the President by law if such law
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does not affirmatively prohibit delegation of the perform­
ance of such function as herein provided for, or specifi­
cally designate the officer or officers to whom it may be 
delegated. This chapter shall not be deemed to limit or 
derogate from any existing or inherent right of the Presi­
dent to delegate the performance of functions vested in 
him by law, and nothing herein shall be deemed to re­
quire express authorization in any case in which such an 
official would be presumed in law to have acted by au­
thority or direction of the President.
As a result of these statutes, the President is authorized to delegate 
any power vested in him by statute unless the statute “affirmatively 
prohibits] delegation.” In our view, a statute should be construed as an 
“affirmative” prohibition of delegation only if it prohibits delegation 
expressly or by unmistakable implication. The purpose of §§ 301 and 
302 is to facilitate the functioning o f the Executive by specifically 
authorizing delegation in the great majority o f cases. To this end, § 301 
states a general rule in favor of delegation. In light of the breadth of 
this general rule, the exception in § 302 should be narrowly construed. 
The same inference can be drawn from the fact that Congress took care 
in § 302 not to derogate from any “existing or inherent right of the 
President to delegate the performance of functions vested in him by 
law.”
Statutes which do expressly or by unmistakable implication prohibit 
delegation are subject to the possible constitutional objection that the 
power to delegate is inherent in the Executive and may not be re­
stricted by Congress. The issue is a difficult one and has never been 
resolved in court. In our view, the wiser course is to comply with any 
clear congressional intention to prohibit delegation, in order to avoid 
testing the limits of this constitutional question, unless circumstances 
imperatively require delegation.
In the brief time we have had to review the matter, we have discov­
ered only a very few statutes that expressly or by unmistakable implica­
tion prohibit delegation. W hat follows is a description of categories of 
statutes that fall or may fall within this general class.
1. Statutes Explicitly Prohibiting Delegation
The clearest cases are those in which the statute explicitly prohibits 
delegation. An example is found in the Export Administration Act of 
1979, 50 U.S.C. § 2403(e) (Supp. Ill 1979), which provides that:
The President may delegate the power, authority, and 
discretion conferred upon him by this A ct to such depart­
ments, agencies, or officials of the Government as he may 
consider appropriate, except that no authority under this
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Act may be delegated to, or exercised by, any official of 
any department or agency the head of which is not ap­
pointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. The President may not delegate or 
transfer his power, authority, and discretion to overrule 
or modify any recommendation or decision made by the 
Secretary [of Commerce], the Secretary of Defense, or 
the Secretary of State pursuant to the provisions of this 
Act.
2. Statutes Conferring Nondelegable Functions
An unmistakable congressional intent to prohibit delegation may also 
be inferred from statutes that impose on the President a duty or power 
to exercise a nondelegable function. For example, it is commonly 
thought that only the President may issue an executive order or procla­
mation. Statutes that authorize the President to take an action, but 
require him to act by way of executive order or proclamation, can 
therefore be read as precluding delegation. An example is found in 22 
U.S.C. § 441(a):
Whenever the President . . . shall find that there exists a 
state of war between foreign states, and that it is neces­
sary to promote the security or preserve the peace of the 
United States or to protect the lives of citizens of the 
United States, the President shall issue a proclamation 
naming the states involved; and he shall, from time to 
time by proclamation, name other states as and when they 
become involved in the war.
3. Statutes Implicitly Prohibiting Delegation
A broad range of statutes confer powers on the President but do not 
state in terms or in the legislative history whether those powers are 
delegable. In some instances, the character or importance of the powers 
in question, or other special circumstances, may constitute a sufficient 
indication of a legislative intent to prohibit delegation.
In the brief time available, we have been unable to reach any firm 
conclusions regarding particular statutes in this category. In general, it 
would appear that statutory powers that have been exercised by the 
President himself on a consistent and longstanding basis are more likely 
than others to be held nondelegable. An example might be the Presi­
dent’s statutory power to enter into or terminate trade agreements with 
certain nations under 19 U.S.C. § 1351.
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A second special circumstance that can give rise to an inference of 
nondelegability occurs when Congress gives authority to an agency but 
subjects that authority to a requirement of presidential approval. In this 
circumstance, it can be argued that a delegation of the President’s 
approval authority back to the agency would subvert the evident legis­
lative intent to assure review by someone outside the agency, while a 
delegation to anyone else would conflict with the congressional intent 
to centralize primary administrative responsibility in the agency. For an 
example o f such a statute, see § 12(k) o f the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781(k).5
III. Delegable Fumctioms
All remaining functions o f  the President may be delegated to subordi­
nate officers. Many statutes explicitly authorize delegation. See, e.g., 22 
U.S.C. § 2381 (delegation of certain foreign affairs powers). In the 
absence o f specific authorization, the general delegation statute, 3 
U.S.C. §§301, 302, explicitly authorizes delegation except where pre­
cluded by statute. It is beyond the scope o f this memorandum to 
describe the full extent o f  the presidential powers and responsibilities 
that may be delegated.6 In general, powers which may be delegated 
include those o f approval, authorization, and assignment; powers to 
establish and convene certain administrative commissions, to designate 
responsible officers, and to  make certain factual determinations; powers 
to direct that certain actions be taken, to fix compensation of officers, 
to prescribe certain rules and regulations, and to make recommenda­
tions or reports.
It bears repetition that the President may not delegate his power to 
delegate his own functions. This is, in our view, a function that is 
constitutionally vested in the President personally. The President may 
delegate his powers if he is capable o f a conscious decision to do so. If, 
however, he is incapable o f  such a decision, delegation cannot occur. If 
such a situation continues for a substantial period o f time, it would 
appear desirable to initiate procedures for presidential succession under 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.7
5 We emphasize that the above examples are entirely tentative; it may well be that, upon further 
examination o f the statutes and their legislative histories, this Office would conclude that Congress did 
not intend to prohibit delegation.
6 For a description o f the President’s general authonty, see President's Advisory Council on 
Executive Organization, The Powers and Responsibilities of the President (1970).
7 It might be possible for the President to delegate his powers contingent upon the occurrence o f a 
specified event such as a certification by the President’s personal physician that the President is 
temporarily incapable o f making a conscious decision. We would emphasize, however, that this 
procedure should not be used if its effect is contrary to the intent of the procedures for presidential 
succession contained in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
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IV. Form and Method of Delegation
Whenever a presidential function or power is delegable, it may be 
delegated to the head of any department or agency in the Executive 
Branch, or any official thereof, if the official is appointed with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. 3 U.S.C. §301. By statute, such a 
delegation is ordinarily accomplished through the preparation and pub­
lication of a written order or memorandum. The relevant document is 
normally signed by the President personally; but there is no express 
statutory requirement to that effect. In our opinion, the relevant statu­
tory requirements are satisfied as long as the President actually makes 
the delegation in question and causes an appropriate written memorial 
to be prepared and published. He need not sign the document by his 
own hand. See United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84-92 (1893); 7 Op. 
Att’y Gen. at 472-73 (1855); 22 Op. A tt’y Gen. 82, 84 (1898). More­
over, the statute does not purport to restrict the President’s constitu­
tional power to delegate his powers and functions. 3 U.S.C. § 302. We 
believe that a President may determine in an exigent circumstance that 
it is necessary to delegate a power or function without immediate 
compliance with the normal formal requisites (i.e., publication of a 
written document). Such a delegation is effective if it is necessary to 
enable the President to discharge his constitutional duty.
T h e o d o r e  B. O l s o n  
Assistant Attorney General 




P r io r  P r e s i d e n t i a l  D i s a b i l i t i e s
This is a summary of prior presidential disabilities and the resulting 
effect on presidential authority.1
1. James Madison suffered from a severe fever in the summer of 1813 
in the midst of disputes with Congress on how to pay for the War of 
1812. I. Brant, James Madison: Commander-in-Chief, 1812-1836, at 
184-94 (1961). Daniel Webster reported at one point that Madison was 
too weak to read resolutions brought to his bedside. Id. at 186-87. Both 
Houses of Congress became “engrossed” for over a month in specula­
tion on the succession,2 since the Vice President was aged and there 
was a vacancy in the position of President pro tempore of the Senate. J. 
Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment 4-5 (1976) (Feerick). Madison 
recovered, however, and no legislation was passed nor were formal 
arrangements for the delegation or transfer of power implemented.
2. William Henry Harrison was inaugurated on March 4, 1841, and 
died of pneumonia on April 4, 1841. His illness was so short that the 
question of inability apparently did not arise.3
3. James A. Garfield was wounded on July 2, 1881, by an assassin 
and died 80 days later on September 19, 1881. Vice President Chester 
A. A rthur did not act in his stead. Arthur refused to do so because of a 
fear, shared by many constitutional scholars of the time, that once he 
had assumed the powers and duties of the office, they would “devolve 
on the Vice President” permanently, leaving him unable to turn the 
reins back to the President. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 6. See S. Rep.
M ateria l consulted included the N.Y. Times, S. Rep. No. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), and 
hearings held in 1958. Presidential Inability: Hearings on S.J. Res. 100, S.J. Res. 133, S.J. Res. 134, S.J. 
Res. 141, S.J. Res. 143, S.J Res. 144, S. 238, and S. 3113 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Amendments o f  the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [hereinafter cited as 1958 
Hearings]. A list o f articles on presidential inability can be found in the 1958 Hearings, at 41-42.
2 The first succession act was passed in 1792. Act of March 1, 1792, §§9-11, 1 Stat. 239. 
Unsuccessful efforts to change this statute occurred in 1820, 1856, and 1881.
3 When Harrison died, Secretary of State Daniel Webster questioned whether the Constitution 
meant that Vice President John Tyler became “Acting President,” rather than the President. Tyler 
disagreed and took the oath as President, thus establishing the MTyler precedent” that the Vice 
President does succeed to the Office o f  the President when the prior occupant dies. 1958 Hearings at 
149.
The deaths o f Zachary Taylor (July 9, 1850) and Abraham Lincoln (April 15, 1865) were appar­
ently so swift that their Vice Presidents (Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson) assumed control without 
trouble. Feerick at 7-8.
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No. 66, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 6 (1965) (1965 Senate Report). Although 
the entire Cabinet believed Garfield to be unable to carry out his 
duties,4 four of them, including the Attorney General, agreed with 
Arthur’s analysis. Secretary of State James G. Blaine was in fact criti­
cized for attempting to usurp presidential powers during Garfield’s 
lengthy illness. 1958 Hearings at 149-50.5
4. Grover Cleveland had two major operations for cancer of the 
mouth in July 1893. He told almost no one, including Vice President 
Adlai Stevenson. The two operations took place on a friend’s yacht, 
with Cleveland unconscious and strapped to a chair propped against the 
mast. Feerick at 11-12. The complete secrecy was due to fears that the 
country might suffer an economic panic if it knew the President had 
cancer. The truth was apparently suppressed until 1917. Feerick at 12.6
5. William McKinley was wounded on Friday, September 6, 1901. 
He underwent emergency surgery and his doctors issued optimistic 
statements about his recovery. So positive was the outlook that Vice 
President Theodore Roosevelt and the Cabinet members who had gath­
ered in Buffalo over the weekend began to disperse. M. Leech, In the 
Days of McKinley 598-99 (1959). “[T]he Vice-President was so firmly 
convinced that the emergency was over that he went to join his family 
at a camp in the Adirondacks, twelve miles from telegraph or tele­
phone.” Id. at 599. When McKinley began to fail, a guide was sent up 
into the mountains to fetch Roosevelt. Although he rushed back, 
Roosevelt arrived to take the oath of Office 12 hours after McKinley’s 
death on September 14.
6. Woodrow Wilson was incapacitated from a stroke for about eight 
months of his second term. At no time did Vice President Thomas R. 
Marshall attempt to take over. See 1958 Hearings at 19. The hesitation 
was due to a fear that such action would be viewed as an effort to oust 
Wilson permanently. When he recovered, Wilson forced Secretary of 
State Lansing, who had called Cabinet meetings and suggested that 
Marshall take over as Acting President, to resign, charging him with 
disloyalty. Id.
1. Franklin Roosevelt was in declining health during his last year in 
office, and died on April 12, 1945. Vice President Harry S. Truman had 
had only two conversations with Roosevelt since the inauguration, 
neither dealing with disability. Feerick at 17. Perhaps as a reaction to 
this, Truman supported a new succession statute, Act of June 25, 1948, 
Pub. L. No. 80-771, 62 Stat. 672, 677-78 (1948).
4 Garfield was able to conduct only one minor piece of business—the signing of an extradition 
paper Feerick at 9
8 Arthur, who succeeded Garfield, suffered from an increasingly debilitating kidney disease while in 
office. Although he gradually reduced his schedule, he does not appear to have become completely 
incapacitated. Feerick at 10-11.
6 It was the death of Cleveland’s first Vice President, Thomas A. Hendricks, in 1885, while 
Congress was out o f session, which accelerated passage of the Presidential Succession Act, Pub. L. 
No. 49-1, 24 Stat. 1 (1886)
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8. Dwight D. Eisenhower suffered three major illnesses while in 
office—a heart attack (1955), ileitis (1956), and a “mild” stroke (1957). 
From  the first, Vice President Richard Nixon consulted with the Cabi­
net and developed a procedure for relaying important matters to the 
President. A White House request for an opinion on the temporary 
delegation of presidential power was not acted upon because Attorney 
General Brownell felt there were sufficient legal arrangements in place 
to handle day-to-day operations.
Eisenhower was very troubled by the implications of the disability 
problem during each of his illnesses. He asked the Department of 
Justice to study the problem and recommend a solution, urged Con­
gress to act, and entered into an informal agreement with Mr. Nixon. 
Feerick at 20-22. The agreement provided that:
1. In the event of inability the President would—if 
possible—so inform the Vice President, and the Vice 
President would serve as Acting President, exercising the 
powers and duties of the office until the inability had 
ended.
2. In the event o f an inability which would prevent the 
President from so communicating with the Vice Presi­
dent, the Vice President, after such consultation as seems 
to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide 
upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the office 
and would serve as Acting President until the inability 
had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine 
when the inability had ended and at that time would 
resume the full exercise o f the powers and duties of the 
Office.
1965 Senate Report at 7 .7 Although Congress did hold hearings, no 
permanent action was taken.8
9. Lyndon B. Johnson was hospitalized four times, the first time 
being for a major bout with the flu (January 23-27, 1965).9 In October 
1965, Johnson was hospitalized for gall bladder surgery.10 He was
7See also N.Y. Times* March 4, 1958, at 1, col. 2. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson entered into 
similar agreements with their Vice Presidents. 1965 Senate Report at 7. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1965, at 
13, col. 1. The Johnson-Humphrey agreement was identical to the Eisenhower-Nixon agreement. The 
Kennedy agreement differed only in that it urged the Vice President to consult with the Cabinet and 
the A ttorney General i4as a matter o f wisdom and sound judgment.” 1965 Senate Report at 7.
8See 1958 Hearings, supra, and Hearings before the Special Subcommittee to Study Presidential 
Disability o f  the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
9 A t the time, Vice President Hubert H Humphrey stated that there had been discussions of when 
he would take over and a copy of the Johnson-Humphrey accord was made available to the press on 
January 28. See note 7, supra, and text.
10 The accord was again noted by the press and columnist A rthur Krock urged the states to ratify
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
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anesthetized for three to four hours, after which Press Secretary 
Moyers announced that Johnson was again able to make presidential 
decisions.11
The same pattern was repeated in November 1967, when Johnson 
underwent simultaneous surgery for a polyp on his vocal cord and 
repair of a ventral hernia. He was anesthetized for about an hour and a 
half. Note was made of the agreement that could make Humphrey 
“Acting President” and columnist Tom Wicker urged that the Twenty- 
Fifth Amendment be ratified.
In December 1968, Johnson was again hospitalized for the flu. The 
papers, however, said little other than that he worked on government 
papers on one day of his stay.
10. Richard M. Nixon was hospitalized from July 12-20, 1973, for 
viral pneumonia. The President’s press office said that he would be able 
to do necessary work and that he was not sick enough to require the 
Vice President to make special arrangements. In an interview, Vice 
President Spiro T. Agnew said that there was no agreement between 
the President and him on what to do in the event of Nixon’s disability 
and that the issue had never been discussed.
Although there were persistent rumors about Nixon’s health during 
the months prior to his resignation, the only White House announce­
ment was an acknowledgment that the President suffered from phlebi­
tis. The operation on his leg did not occur until September 23, 1974, 
after his resignation.
11. Jimmy Carter’s scheduled surgery for hemorrhoids in late De­
cember 1978, was cancelled. Preparations for the Vice President to 
assume power under § 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment were also 
cancelled.
L a r r y  L .  S i m m s  
Acting Assistant Attorney General 
Office o f  Legal Counsel
11 Citing recent history, Johnson had urged Congress to act on the disability problem in his State of 
the Union address in January, 1965. The proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment was sent to the states in 
July 1965.
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